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Elliott and Marcus: From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land Development Control

FROM EUCLID TO RAMAPO: NEW DIRECTIONS
IN LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROLS
Donald H. Elliott* and Norman Marcus*

I

F city planners are to succeed in shaping the growth and development of modem American cities, they must regulate the use of
land in far more affirmative ways than they were able to achieve with
their traditional zoning ordinances. Land use regulations have historically been designed to prevent harm, e.g., to separate incompatible uses, to limit density and scale of particular neighborhoods,
to prohibit or restrict development where public services are unavailable and to protect adjoining parcels from invasions of their
light and air. These regulations, based on single lot development,
are not concerned with how a section of the city actually works,
i.e., what positive relationships between single lot development in a
unique area should be encouraged-whether office workers have
room to walk on the sidewalk or can get into a subway entrance.
As general rules, single lot regulations tend to codify minimal
standards. They encourage inexpensive and often inadequate solutions to circulation problems and amenity needs. Traditional zoning
has thus helped turn the concentration of activities that is essential
to the success of a city into congestion.
In our view, government should intervene in the development
process, creating zoning and other techniques that will encourage
and even coerce private investment to make the city a more pleasant
and efficient place in which to live and work. Public steps will still
have to be taken in certain situations to prevent development where
necessary. Accentuating the positive does not mean eliminating the
negative in all cases.
New York City has developed and refined a series of tools to
shape the nature of private development. The techniques that have
been used raise interesting questions about the legitimate extent of
government control and about the nature of new interests in land
that have been created. It is the purpose of this article to explore
* Chairman, New York City Planning Commission; "*Counsel, New York City

Planning Commission; The authors wish to express their appreciation to Richard
Singer for his helpful research in connection with the preparation of this article.
1. Zoning admittedly has minimal impact in areas where private investment is unprofitable. In these areas the City has relied most heavily on its capital budget and
eminent domain urban renewal powers which have traditionally employed use and
design parcel controls in the public interest which were individualized to reflect the
needs of a particular neighborhood.
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the legal aspects of some of these questions as well as to explore the
use of zoning as a creative device for eliciting public benefit from
private development.
In recent years central business district office development, and
to some extent luxury housing, have seen the major thrust of private
investment in New York City, and hence were most susceptible to
a kind of zoning which called forth buildings which did more for
the people of New York than the structures the City was getting
2
under more traditional zoning.
New York City's national center function3 does not rest solely
on its ability to attract large numbers of office buildings within the
Central Business District. The distinctiveness and the excitement
that the City generates is derived to a large extent from the relatively
uneconomic amenities-both tangible and intangible-that it offers
to residents and visitors alike. There are few cities in the world that
can rival New York's cultural complexes, its shopping streets, its
variegated residential communities and other sources of civic pride.
And yet, in New York, as in other urban centers, there exists a
"tension" between those forces that provide the economic power
that keeps the City's dynamo churning and those relatively "uneconomic" forces that are constantly threatened by new construction
and development and which supply the vitality and personality that
are integral parts of city life. Shaping and directing these conflicting
forces is a delicate but necessary task. Public control can be exercised
to preserve relatively "uneconomic" but desirable elements of city
life without stifling private initiative or requiring unnecessary
public investment. Certain carrot-and-stick techniques have been
evolved to achieve this objective including incentive zoning, development rights transfer, privately reimbursed exercise of eminent
domain powers and restrictions running with the land. A brief
review of the traditional police power rubrics indicates the legitimacy of these techniques for such a purpose.
2. In Manhattan an average of seven million square feet of office space was added
annually between 1965 and 1970. See Carruth, Manhattan's Office Building Binge,
FORTUNE, Oct. 1969, at 114; Carruth, New York Hangs Out The For Rent Sign, FORTUNE, Feb. 1971, at 86. Such construction strengthened New York City's tax base and
provided jobs for hundreds of thousands of blue and white collar workers. As the

City Planning Commission noted in the Introduction to its Comprehensive Plan for
New York City, such office "[cjoncentration is the genius of the City, its reason for
being, the source of its vitality and its excitement." NEv YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, I PLAN FOR NEw YoRK CIY 31 (1969). See generally N. MARcus & M. GRoVEs,
THE NEW ZONING (1970) [hereinafter NEW ZONING].
3. NEW YoRK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, I PLAN FOR NEW YoRx CITY 31 (1969);

see also NEW ZONING at xvi.
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I.

THE TRADITIONAL POINT OF DEPARTURE

Traditionally, most municipalities avoided abridgement of an
individual's free exercise of his property rights.4 During the early
part of the twentieth century, however, legislative attempts to
control the development of the nation's rapidly expanding cities
were upheld in the courts.6
In 1916, New York City enacted the nation's first comprehensive
zoning odinance. A year later, the State legislature granted the City
the power to "regulate and limit the height, bulk and location of
buildings... the area of yards, courts and other open spaces, and
...the density of population in any given area .... ." While these
regulations were generally considered as extensions of the police
power to "promote the public health, safety and general welfare,"
they were also viewed by some as a taking of private property without just compensation or due process of law.
Despite such serious challenge, however, it was not until 1926
that the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance was tested by the
Supreme Court. In a landmark decision, Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,8 the Supreme Court validated a comprehensive zoning
plan. The Court's holding was narrow. However, the general test
of a zoning ordinance suggested by the Court is still instructive.
Before a zoning ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, its
provisions must be shown to be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare."9
Euclid and its progeny reflect the idea that "general welfare" is
a constantly growing and necessary aspect of the sovereign police
power. Euclid also suggests that the use of zoning is a legitimate
4. President George Washington imposed height restrictions on buildings of the
nation's capital in 1791 only to have them suspended five years later in order to attract
"Mechanics and others whose Circumstances did not admit of erecting houses authorized by the said Regulations." THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NATIONAL CAPITAL (S.
Padover ed. 1946) quoted in C. HAAR, LAND-Us5 PLANNING 157 (2d ed. 1971) [herein-

after

HAAR].

5. See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1915); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
6. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20 (24) (McKinney 1968).
7. In August of 1922, the Department of Commerce drafted a Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act, which was similar to New York's statute. See C. BERGER, LAND OwNERsni'
AND USE 611 (1968) [hereinafter BERGER].

8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court held: "It is enough for us to determine, as we do,
that the ordinance in its general scope and dominant features, so far as its provisions
are here involved, is a valid exercise of authority, leaving other provisions to be dealt
with as cases arise directly involving them." Id. at 397.
9. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
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mode of protecting the ever-changing general welfare. Justice Sutherland recognized this trend: 10
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but
with the great increase and concentration of population,
problems have developed, and constantly are developing,
which require, and will continue to require, additional
restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private
lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions,
are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a
century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have
been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. . . . [W]hile the
meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope
of their application must expand or contract to meet the new
and different conditions which are constantly coming within
the field of their operation.
Courts have continued to review zoning ordinances against the
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable"'" test and as the New York
Court of Appeals recently noted, "[r]estrictions upon the use of
property, which were deemed unreasonable in 1909, are regarded
today as entirely reasonable and natural."' 2
In Euclid, the effect of the zoning ordinance was to reduce the
value of the plaintiff's land by two-thirds from $150 to $50 per front
foot. As such, it was averred that the regulation attempted to restrict
and control the lawful uses of appellee's land so as to confiscate and
destroy a great part of its value.' 3 Courts have consistently held that
where the property was not deprived of all profitable remaining
use and where the regulation is rationally related to a comprehensive
plan, the zoning ordinance will be upheld.14
The fact that such restrictions apply only to certain properties
10. Id. at 386-87.
11. Note 9 supra.
12. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 269, 225 N.E2.d 749, 752, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22,
26 (1967).
13. See IHAR at 160.
14. See generally Sackman, Impact of Zoning and Eminent Domain Upon Each
Other, 1971 SoVTmvESrRN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND

EMINENT DOMAIN 107, 112. In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36
(1962), a zoning regulation, rendering a gravel pit worthless, was upheld. The public
health of the adjacent communities was adversely affected, and the land presumably

had other uses. But see Chase v. City of Glen Cove, 41 Misc. 2d 889, 246 N.Y.S.2d 975
(Sup. Ct, 1964), where private property was placed in a public housing zone which
precluded all other uses. This was found confiscatory since it excessively limited, if not
totally vitiated, the owner's earning capacity.
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within a zoning district is not necessarily discriminatory, provided
there is a rational basis in the community plan for such distinctions.
"The constitutional guarantee of equal protection does not require
the universal application of legislative act, and distinctions may
properly be made in the application of regulations."'15 The key to
the "equal protection" test is that the proposed regulation be not
only uniformly applied but also "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."'0
A judicial determination as to whether a zoning ordinance is
arbitrary, confiscatory or discriminatory is necessary to delineate
the fine line that separates a valid regulation from an unconstitutional "taking."' 7 The courts, in invalidating a zoning law, seldom
rest their decision explicitly on this ground, for normally such a
law would also violate the more familiar rule against confiscation.
But the New York courts apparently have recognized as a distinct
ground of invalidity the following principle: Even though a zoning
law is not confiscatory, it is still invalid if it imposes upon a landowner the cost of a land use beneficial to the public, where there is
no rational ground for singling out the landowner to bear this cost.18
How far a state's police power may extend to effectuate the
broadening concepts of "public purpose" and "general welfare"
remains a subject of judicial interpretation. The parameters dis-

cussed above suggest analytic criteria, but as Justice Sutherland
15. Fonoroff in Naw ZomnGo at 90. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,
336 U.s. 106 (1949).
16. See Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1154

(1955).
17. The fifth amendment provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." See N.Y. CONSr. art. I, § 7.

18. The leading New York case which demonstrates this point is Vernon Park

Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 507 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954). There a
landowner, desiring to erect a shopping center, sued to invalidate a zoning resolution
which placed his property in a "public parking" classification. The land adjacent to
the railroad station and otherwise surrounded by the downtown business district, had

always been used for parking purposes. The town fathers wished to preserve this use
since the parking facility was needed, and its elimination would cause traffic congestion
on the streets. The Court of Appeals invalidated the ordinance in an opinion which
lacks clarity but appears to rest on the "taking" rationale, noting that: "However
compelling and acute the community traffic problem may be, its solution does not
lie in placing an undue and uncompensated burden on the individual owner of a
single parcel of land in the guise of regulation, even for a public purpose." Id. at
498, 121 N.E.2d at 519. It should be obvious that the "discrimination" and the "taking"
tests are in reality only two sides of the same coin which is stamped "equal protection"
on one side and "substantive due process" on the other. For a thorough analysis of
the "taking" vs. "regulating" issue see Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YAa L.J. 149 (1971) and Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police
Power: the Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. . REV. 1 (1970-71).
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noted in Euclid, the line that "separates the legitimate from the
illegitimate ... is not capable of precise delimitation." 19
II.

NEw DmECnONS

A. Incentive Zoning
The concept of incentive zoning is based on the premise that
certain uneconomic uses and physical amenities will not be provided
in new development without an economic incentive. By amenity,
we refer to a non-revenue producing building feature, be it plaza,
park, covered pedestrian space, arcade, on-site subway access, etc.
By incentive, we mean an economic advantage to a developer not
present under traditional zoning such as additional floor area beyond
the district's stipulated maximum or greater use freedom, which is
granted on condition that specified uneconomic uses or physical
amenities are provided.
Density increments in the form of "bonus" floor area are usually
accompanied by density-ameliorating amenities which rationalize
the development result against sound planning standards. Where an
uneconomic use is "bonussed" in a special district without attendant
density-ameliorating amenities, it reflects the planning judgment
that the necessary services to support additional density are present
in the area.
In most of the cases discussed, the special district incentives and
obligations are optional. This means that a developer may elect to
proceed under the residual or pre-existing zoning without taking
advantage of the density increment and without providing the
amenity. However, the incentives in each case are structured so as
to make the cost-benefit equations come out in favor of electing to
provide the suggested uneconomic use or physical amenity.
The incentive zoning approach was first outlined in New York
City's 1961 Zoning Resolution. 20 A developer who provided plazas
and arcades at street level in high density districts was allowed up
to 20 percent floor area beyond the district maximum. Although
initial attempts at incentive zoning yielded mixed results21-primar19. 272 U.S. at 387.
20. See NEW YoRx, N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 24-14 to 24-16 (1972) [hereinafter
ZoNING RESOLuTIoN].

21. Random and unintegrated plaza
along the Avenue of the Americas in the
tunity for New York City. The lack of
shops or recreation has been particularly

placement in connection with development
1960's has been criticized as a missed opporfocus for pedestrians either in the form of
criticized.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol1/iss1/6

6

Elliott and Marcus: From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land Development Control

Hofstra Law Review
ily because of its questionable underlying assumption that plazas
and arcades were good anywhere-subsequent more discriminating
use of this technique has been well-received nationwide 22 and has
served as a prototype for other examples of creative urban zoning. 2
Special District incentive zoning establishes an individualized
form of regulation allowing flexibility and administrative discre2
tion.2 4 It reflects a shift from the traditional zoning classifications 5
and a departure from "the variance," and the "small parcel amendment"-two modes of reclassifications which some commentators
26
consider to have out-lived their original usefulness.
The principle of individualized parcel regulation inherent in
conditional zoning27 is at the root of the special district approach.
This approach offers a municipality a means to provide individualized attention to particular area problems and opportunities.
Other cities have used this device, 28 which permits preservation
of historic, cultural and perhaps most significant of all uneconomic
but functional uses. The municipality additionally benefits from
increased tax revenues and the developer capitalizes the value of
additional rental income.
1. To Encourage an Uneconomic but Necessary Use (The Special
Theatre District)
The traditional zoning ordinance regulates all properties within
a relatively homogeneous district so that they may be developed to
bulk and density levels which would not over-strain city services
and permits them to house a variety of uses found compatible with
the character of the area. Such an ordinance permits many commercial uses in a commercially zoned central business district. Some
of these uses, however, are more profitable than others, and it is the
profitable uses that the traditional ordinance encourages through its
unweighted, equalitarian approach.
The uneconomic but necessary use will disappear in an area of
high and ever-increasing land values unless the municipality can
22. See Huxtable, Thinking Man's Zoning, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1971, § 2 at 22,
col. 1.
23. See, e.g., SAN ]FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 122, in NEW ZONING, Appendix D
at 227.
24. Heyman in NEw ZONING at 23-42.
25. See discussion of zoning classification in Section II D of this article infra.
26. See REPS, Requiem for Zoning, 16 ZONING DiGEsr 33-39, 57-63 (1964).
27. See note 25 supra.
28. E.g., CITY or DETROIT, MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE § A-13 (1968) (civic center
zone), PHILADELPHIA, PA., ZONING AND PLANNING CODE § 14-2005 (1959), cited by Fonoroff
in NEw ZONING at 82.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 6

From Euclid to Ramapo
afford to subsidize it through urban renewal land write-down,
capital budget allocation or a departure from the traditional zoning
approach which would expressly stimulate its provision.
In 1967, the New York City Planning Commission proposed an
innovative zoning technique that would preserve New York's position as the national theater capital without curtailing construction
of the high-rise office buildings which were steadily replacing the
old, uneconomic, two- and three-story theaters. This plan reflected
more than just sentiment and nostalgia. There were compelling
findings linking New York's pre-eminence as national corporate
headquarters to its legitimate theaters around which so many related
activities, such as radio and television, shopping, dining and tourism,
clustered. The device used was incentive zoning. Rather than inhibit
the building of new office space in the Times Square area which was
well served by the City mass transit network, the Special Theater
District" offered the developer an incentive in the form of a floor
area ratio (FAR)3 0 bonus of up to 20 percent to build a legitimate
theater as part of his project. Incentive zoning subsidized use
through the carrot of additional density and thus sought to attract
theaters and shape development in accordance with the City's
comprehensive plan.
An opponent 3 ' of the Special Theater District zoning legislation
raised the legal objection of discrimination in connection with the
procedure of reviewing individual applications for the 20 percent
FAR bonus instead of ministerially according the bonus districtwide upon provision of pre-determined theatrical facilities. Although
free from the tinge of discrimination, this suggested alternative was
hardly likely to meet the area's planning goals which included a
selective infusion of new theaters of type and seating capacity
related to the area's needs over time. The objector never filed suit
and ultimately came in to discuss a development project in the area
which included a theater.
The demonstrable linkages in the City's comprehensive plan
29. NEW YoR CITY PLANNING COMMISSION REP., CP-20000 (Nov. 1, 1967). See also
ZONING RESOLuTION § 81-01 et seq. The district stretches from 57th Street to 40th Street

and is bounded by Eighth Avenue on the west and the Avenue of the Americas on the
east, an area within which most of the City's legitimate theaters presently exist. See
New York City Zoning Map, 8c and 8d, effective Mar. 25, 1971, City Planning Commission.
30. FAR (Floor Area Ratio) is a concept which is used to control the amount of
building on a lot. The FAR "number" represents the multiple of the lot area which
produces the allowable maximum floor area in the development.
31. The owner of half of New York City's legitimate theaters operating under the
terms of an anti-trust consent decree.
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between a flourishing legitimate theater and a healthy national
center in New York City made any claim of arbitrariness in the
Special Theater District legislation difficult to sustain. The general
welfare has been served by the legislation which has so far produced
five new legitimate theaters in the Theater District.8 2
2. To Protect a Major Public Investment (The Special Lincoln
Square District)
One of the purposes of urban renewal is to bring about a renewal
of private interest in developing urban land. Where the urban
renewal project is successful in realizing this goal, the area surrounding the project begins to "take off" in real estate parlance and
private redevelopment takes up where public redevelopment leaves
off. A problem arises, however, when the particular, often sophisticated design mandated under the urban renewal plan abruptly
terminates at its boundaries and the optional physical forms of
traditional zoning take over.
The alternative of extending the urban renewal designation to
this surrounding area and imposing particularized development
controls designed to integrate the pre-existing project into the
balance of the neighborhood is probably unavailable under the
assumed hypothetical because blight has been eliminated and the
surrounding area is clearly valuable for redevelopment. For an
urban renewal designation to lie, land has to be substandard and
insanitary.8 3
In such a situation the traditional zoning must be reshaped to
encourage development compatible with the urban renewal project
and should include mandatory controls where necessary. If an incentive zoning approach is taken it may even be possible to cope
with some of the more subtle economic and social impacts of the
urban renewal plan.
Such a problem faced New York City upon completion of the
$180,000,000 Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts. Luxury rental
apartment houses with banks, travel bureaus and plazas on street
32. On Sixth Avenue and 46th Street a new forty-six story office building contains
a 120-seat cabaret theater and a below-grade 850-seat space for the "American Place
Theater" company. In return for providing these amenities, the developer was granted
a total FAR of 20.5 (a FAR bonus of 2.5) which was translated into approximately
three floors of rentable office space. See Zoning Rebuilds the Theater, PROGRESSIVE
ARacH., Dec. 1970, at 76. Two new legitimate theaters have opened as part of the
50 story office-theater complex at Broadway and 50th Street because of this zoning
provision, as has a large stage house fronting directly on Times Square contained
within the high office building at Broadway and 44th Street.

33. N.Y. GEN. Mumc. LAw §§ 502(3) and (4)(McKinney Supp. 1972-73).
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level threatened to replace existing moderate income shops and oldlaw tenements housing persons of moderate means. Despite the
presence of enormous crowds generated by the many activities of
Lincoln Center, traditional zoning neither required nor encouraged
provision of useful pedestrian circulation improvements, additional
subway access, covered public spaces, or complementary shops in
connection with burgeoning private redevelopment. The Special
Lincoln Square District 4 permits developers 20 percent more floor
area on sites within the district as an incentive for providing certain
amenities.
These amenities include pedestrian malls, gallerias, covered
plazas, and pedestrian-oriented circulation improvements. The district further mandates the height of building walls along certain
streets, the location of arcades35 and types of commercial use at street
level in order to guide the orderly redevelopment of the affected
area. These design and planning restrictions relate to the general
character of Broadway as a diagonal street intersecting the district
and to the character of the Lincoln Center development.
3. To Realize a PrecisePlan of Public Amenities in an Area Ripe
for Future Private Development (The Greenwich Street Development District)
All too often an area overlooked for central business district
expansion is suddenly ripe for development. An elevated subway
34. ZONING RESOLUTION § 82-00 et seq. (added April 24, 1969). The district extends
from 61st to 67th Streets roughly from the east Columbus Avenue frontages to the
west Amsterdam Avenue frontages. Developments incorporating the physical amenities
suggested in the district are scheduled on the Columbus Avenue frontage across from
Lincoln Center's Julliard School of Music and on the southeast corner of Broadway
and 63rd Street. A mixed commercial and residential structure facing the Metropolitan
Opera House on the east side of Broadway incorporates the district's required mandatory arcade and Broadway building wall. See New York City Zoning Map 8c, effective
Mar. 25, 1971, City Planning Commission.
35. Arcades are a major architectural theme of the Metropolitan Opera House,
Philharmonic Hall and New York State Theater at Lincoln Center. Mandatory arcades
will be a feature of any development that is located on the east side of Broadway from
61st Street to 65th Street, and on the east side of Columbus Avenue between 65th and
66th Streets (within the Lincoln Square District), with the hope that an all-weather
pedestrian connection will ultimately extend from Columbus Circle to a point opposite
Lincoln Center when all the intervening parcels are redeveloped.
It might be argued that the mandatory arcade in the Lincoln Square Special District, imposing a public passageway on private property, albeit for laudable purposes,
is a taking under Vernon. Apart from this requirement, however, the legislation obtains
its public areas through bonus floor area incentives and permits the varied uses of
the underlying district (with minor exceptions) in resulting new development. In
our judgment the mandated public use which was compensated through an FAR value
increment in the Lincoln Square statute was minor compared with the sole and exclusive public use of property mandated in Vernon.
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spur may have been demolished, other office expansion areas may
have become exhausted, or the construction of a substantial public
improvement may have made an area particularly desirable at a
given point in time.
Traditional zoning with its single lot focus allows each property
to go its own way with minimal relation to its neighbors.80 It does
not provide such advantages as a continuous pedestrian shopping
spine, and linked subterannean access between major office buildings. The result, where substantial buildings often standing cheek
by jowl succeed in ignoring each other or where such structures
tower in the splendid isolation of arid plazas, has been universally
deplored by architectural critics and the public.
Where it is possible, without the aid of a divining rod, to predict
the imminent likelihood of private redevelopment, incentive zoning
can be the device through which to realize a coordinated area-wide
series of public amenities. Such a scheme could turn disparate
properties into an interrelated area-wide development, heretofore
thought achievable only under unified private ownership like Rockefeller Center in New York or under the unifying urban renewal
controls of a Charles Center in Baltimore. These amenities will take
shape at the same pace as the principal development and at the
conclusion of the area's redevelopment process the area will be left
with its self-provided parks, appropriately located shops, superior
subway access and stations among other potential urban assets.
The boundaries of the Special Greenwich Street Development
District in Lower Manhattan 7 were drawn to encompass an area
in which major development had just begun and in which it is
expected to continue, at a rate depending largely on the requirement
for additional office space, for the next decade or so. Redevelopment
had been anticipated in this special district for three reasons. First,
the area is adjacent to the Wall Street financial area as well as to
the World Trade Center. Second, it is well served by the subway
and within walking distance of both the PATH New Jersey service
and the Staten Island Ferry. Finally, more than half of the sites
included within the district are undeveloped or underdeveloped
and, therefore, considered likely locations for new buildings.
This special district implements a comprehensive plan for the
growth of an area which now has an employee population of about
36. This includes sky exposure planes which insure adequate access of light and air
to the streets and to neighboring properties.
37. ZONING RESOLUTION § 86-00 et seq. (added Jan. 14, 1971).
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55,000 people on 45 acres. The zoning regulations provide for the
development of the district at elective incentive density increments
above the residual middle density commercial zone38 which require,
alternatively or in combination, improved pedestrian circulation,
easier access to the subway, increased shopping opportunities, additional open space, preservation of the historical character of the
39
area, or other specified amenities.
The Special Greenwich Street Development District is unlike
previous special zoning districts since it operates with a minimum
of administrative action. 40 The elements of the plan are described
in sufficient detail to obviate both discretionary design review and
the individual approval of negotiated incentive bonuses by the City
Planning Commission. Public hearings are not required, and the
open-ended delays which tend to discourage development are
thereby avoided. 41 The Special Greenwich Street Development District has been generally received with approval.4
38. The residual pre-existing classification provides a medium commercial density
(FAR 10) and the minimal controls of traditional zoning which regulate a development
which foregoes the elective incentives and their concomitant obligations.
39. Provision of amenities earns credits which may not exceed a maximum FAR 18
and 55% lot coverage. Compare this technique with Ramapo's point system, Section II
F of this article infra.
40. Both the Special Theater and the Lincoln Square Districts require developers
interested in the incentive to make an application to the City Planning Commission
for a special permit. The permit is granted at the discretion of the Planning Commission, and authorizes modifications of applicable district bulk regulations for any
development that complies with the special districts requirements, conditions and
safeguards.
41. Detailed pre-development regulation, however, runs the risk of minimizing
design flexibility and necessitating resort to the zoning amendment procedure, NEw
YoRx Crry CHARaR § 200, or variance procedure, § 666(5), both of which can be
fraught with open-ended delays. Statutory justification for the issuance of a variance
is that the owner suffers a unique hardship. The variance was originally viewed as a
constitutional safety valve to permit administrative flexibility. See Heyman at 32 and
Marcus at 97 et seq. in NEw ZON NG; ZoNING REsOLUTION § 72-21; N.Y. GEN. Crr LAw
§ 81(4) (McKinney 1968).
42. It does not control design. It merely lists the conveniences and amenities
the city says must be constructed. The developer makes his choice and builds.
He does not have to "barter" bonuses for improvements because the process is
automatic. This eliminates city-builder negotiations for special features as the
price of special permits. No permits or variances are needed.
The Greenwich Street Development District is an extraordinarily shrewd and
progressive scheme, at once a visionary and pragmatic investment in the future.
Huxtable, Concept Points to 'City of Future', N.Y. Times, December 6, 1970, § 8, at 7,
col 6, 8.
The first development in this district incorporates all on-site amenity requirements
including the 2-level pedestrian shopping spine, a pedestrian bridge across Liberty
Street to the World Trade Center and a one million dollar contribution to the cost
of a subterranean connection between the U.S. Steel building on Broadway and the
World Trade Center.
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4. To Preserve a HistoricRetail Avenue (The Special Fifth Avenue
District)
Every city has a special street which over the years has come to
symbolize quality retail merchandising. Before the automobile, it
was patronized by the carriage trade and people often frequented
the street as much to be seen as to shop. With the change in retailing
patterns following the automobile and the advent of regional subcenters as well as more outlying shopping centers, a municipality
may have to consider additional actions to preserve such an area, if
it is not to lose its historic and functional character.
While retailing is falling off, the street may still retain sufficient
cachet to attract other uses such as offices, airline travel bureaus
and banks which can afford higher rents in today's market than can
major retail department store tenants. Such basic real estate market
vitality precludes serious thought of eminent domain approaches to
the problem. And the negative zoning alternative of restricting uses
to retail establishments only probably would preclude substantial
new investment from entering the area, thus insuring its continued
decline without guaranteeing retention of the classy old stores.
Incentive zoning would appear to be the logical device to harness
the still vital development investment engine in such a situation and
nudge it in the direction of continued support of the street's ailing
retailing function. 48 This was the approach New York City took to
Fifth Avenue.
The Special Fifth Avenue District was created to assure the
continuation of Fifth Avenue as Manhattan's major retail street as
well as to preserve it as a showcase of national and international
prestige shopping. 44 The district encourages the concentration of
high quality department stores, retail clustering, restaurants and
related activities that complement the unique character of the avenue.
To further this purpose, attempts were made to maintain the existing uniformity of front wall lines on both sides of Fifth Avenue.
Mid-block connections in the form of porte-cocheres, through-block
arcades and covered pedestrian spaces, are encouraged, rather than
zoning's traditional avenue block-front plazas which could interfere
with the continuity of avenue retail frontage.
43. Best and Co. and DePinna's, practically facing each other across the Avenue
at 51st Street, had announced their closings within weeks of each other. Georg Jensen,
a block away, had earlier made the decision to move to Madison Avenue in the
same area.
44. ZONING RESOLUTION § 87-00 et seq. The district embraces east and west frontages
of Fifth Avenue running from 58th Street south to 38th Street.
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A developer must comply with mandatory allocation of floor area
to retail use, lot improvement and setback regulations. 45 He may
elect to devote still more area to retail use or provide certain specified lot amenities in return for a floor area bonus incentive which
may not exceed 20 percent of the basic FAR permitted by the
underlying district regulations.4 6
The FAR bonus in this district may only be used for residential
floor area. It was felt that, in addition to supporting the area's
primary function (retail stores), a residential density increment
would not have a cumulative effect in relation to commercial use
in the area, i.e., use at different hours would provide the area with
24 hour life rather than produce excessive congestion from nine to
five. Ultimately, the new ultra-luxe residential community over
the avenue would, it was felt, restore the waning carriage trade so
essential to the flavor and style of Fifth Avenue and recreate the
original interdependence between the retail avenue and its immediate mansion-lined hinterland.
5. To Provide Relocation Housing (Special Lower 3rd Avenue
District)
Standard zoning ordinances provide classifications for residential
4
development based on differing density models: low density,
middle density 8 and high density. 49 Reclassification to a higher
density invariably proves to be an incentive to redevelopment which
in turn tends to produce such undesirable consequences as neighborhood stratification and reduction in the City's inventory of older
low rent housing.
The ability to condition such a zoning reclassification on provision of on-site or within-the-vicinity housing for the class of
families dislocated would permit a municipality to enjoy the benefits
to its tax base flowing from such construction while avoiding its
most tragic consequence. It is permissible to prevent landowners
from creating various sorts of external harms, and the legislature
has considerable leeway in defining what is a harm. 50 The imposition
of social costs through the demolition of low-income units could
justify an exaction for general relocation housing purposes.
45. Id. §§ 87-03, 87-04. 87-05.
46. Id. § 87-06.

47. Up to 30 dwelling units per acre.
48. From 80 to 140 dwelling units per acre.

49. From 140 to 400 dwelling units per acre.
50. Heyman in NEw ZONING at 44.
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In Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale,51 the New York Court of
Appeals approved the application of an ordinance that authorized
the Planning Commission to require the developer to pay $250 per
lot to the village recreation fund as a condition to their approval
of his subdivision plat. The court viewed the exaction as a reasonable form of village planning. The decision is important because
the court did not require the expenditure to be made for the "direct
benefit" of the subdivision in question and suggested that courts
will not invalidate such a requirement merely because the exaction
2
will aid the general public as well as the subdivision residents5
A New York City proposal to rezone unconditionally-without
exactions for relocation-a largely underutilized and deteriorating
stretch of Third Avenue south of 14th Street from middle density
to high density58 in conformity with the luxury housing band that
extends north on Third Avenue from 14th Street was criticized by
the public.
The problem facing the City was how to encourage this private
growth without abandoning its responsibility to the low- and
moderate-income tenants and SRO's5 4 who occupied approximately
450 dwelling units in the area. A new plan for a Special Lower
Third Avenue District was made in direct response to the needs
of such tenants who had too often been forced to vacate their apartments in high land value inner city core areas because of impending
urban redevelopment and who had usually been foreclosed from
returning to their neighborhoods because of an insufficient supply
of subsidized replacement housing and because of prohibitively high
new rents.
The new proposal permitted high density luxury apartment
development, built in accordance with certain design requirements
such as widened sidewalks and arcades, only if a developer shouldered
the relocation burden being created by the rezoning in one of two
ways. He could utilize 15 percent of his residential floor area for
low- or moderate-income tenants.5 5 Or he could make a payment to
the City representing his pro rata share of the City's cost of acquiring
51. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
52. See Heyman in Naw ZONING at 44-45.
53. This rezoning would have yielded a net increase of 2,017 dwelling units to the
City's housing supply in an area where existing City transit, school and health facilities
were deemed adequate to handle the load.
54. Single Room Occupants.
55. This scheme would at the very least replace the lost units with an equal number
of lower income apartments. Dwelling units would qualify if their rentals were 50%
of those in equivalent apartments or if they were subsidized through an appropriate
government program.
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two public housing sites capable of producing 450 dwelling units
within the district.56 If the developer resisted these exactions, he
was free to build at the underlying residual middle density zone.
Like other "incentive zoning" proposals the Special Lower
Third Avenue District would provide the City and the local residents with an uneconomic but extremely important use: non-luxury
housing. The goal of adding non-luxury units to the City's housing
supply is hardly arbitrary and would appear to promote the general
welfare. This technique was also not "confiscatory" since the residual zone alternative was always present, and would be unconstitutional only if the City had imposed a "public housing zone," over
certain parcels, thereby depriving the landowners of any profitable
57
use of their property.
An indirect analogy can be drawn between the "incentive
zoning" plan and the typical special assessment technique. 58 When
a landowner is specially benefitted from some government actions in
a manner distinct from the general public's benefit, he can be
required to pay the cost of the improvement required by his development. 59 The rezoning of Third Avenue could thus be regarded
as a public improvement which specially benefits landowners; the
non-luxury housing requirement can be seen as their "special
assessment."
The Special Lower Third Avenue District was approved by the
City Planning Commission but defeated at the Board of Estimate.
Various reasons have been suggested for its defeat. The adjacent
community did not want high density luxury housing, did not trust
the municipal promise of low-rent housing and feared the "ripple
56. This would have written down the high land cost which would otherwise have
been an obstacle to choosing a public housing site in this location. The concept of a
fund has been incorporated in several provisions of the ZONING RESOLUTION. It is

used for "small change" in the Special Greenwich Street Development District § 86-0410
when the provision of physical amenities in a development is not quite commensurate
with the value of the up-zoning. The Commission has sought to incorporate physical
amenities within a development rather than to receive cash to be used for future
amenities. The density ameliorating rationale of amenities under incentive zoning
breaks down when receipt of cash defers amenities for a substantial interval.
The landmark air rights transfer zoning regulations require under § 74-791 a
program for continuing maintenance of the landmark. This has involved, in the case
of the Amster Yard Landmark, provision for a $100,000 trust fund.
The danger of accepting money for zoning changes is self-evident. Under the lower
Third Avenue scheme, the public housing would have been built first and the City
reimbursed as private development occurred over time.
57. See note 14 supra.
58. See Fonoroff in Nm ZONING at 92.
59. Id. See also N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 102(15)(16) (McKinney 1960). For a case
involving misuse of special assessment technique see Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183

(1878).
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effect" of increasing zoning density on adjacent property which they
saw soaring in value so as to put it out of reach of the middle class.
In our opinion, however, the proposal was defeated because the
development community which urged increasing the allowable
density feared a precedent which would make proximate or on-site
provision of relocation housing a condition of zoning density increase. Under this technique the high land value deterrent to class
integration would have been removed.
B.

Development Rights Transfers

Any city where land scarcity pushes land values to the point they
have reached in Manhattan's central business district will be interested in exploring the extent to which development rights transfers
afford the means of preserving low-density landmarks and recreational islands essential to the livability of a metropolis. After a
brief presentation of the central concept, examples from New York
City's experience will be discussed with particular attention paid
to the mandatory development rights transfer imposed on the owner
of the Tudor City Parks.
The development potential of a lot is defined by zoning controls.
New York City's Zoning Resolution allows a certain height, bulk
and density for structures on each lot, proportionate to the size
of the lot and appropriate to its location. Where an underdeveloped
lot is occupied by landmarks or private parks FAR controls in highdensity areas provide every incentive to the owner of such a lot to
demolish the present use and rebuild to the allowable FAR maximum.
Traditional zoning ordinances do not permit transfer of unused
development rights to non-contiguous lots. Such conveyances are
regarded as contrary to the prevailing notions about the need for
uniformity of controls in a given area. It is felt that the essential
interrelationship of zoning density controls to street width, transit
access, school seats, and other objects of planning concern could not
survive indiscriminate transferability of unused development rights
between widely spaced parcels. The unit of development control
chosen by most ordinances was the zoning lot. Had a different unit
of control been chosen as its basis-perhaps a block basis, or a square
mile basis-there would have been no bias against wider area transferability of development potential. A block-by-block control can
achieve density objectives as successfully as a lot-by-lot approach.10
60. N. Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 86 LAW & CoTrrMP. PROB.
372-79 (1971).
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It became necessary to find another location for the unused
development potential of socially beneficial lots if the present desirable underdevelopment was to be retained. The three development
rights transfer schemes discussed below all solved this problem. In
the case of Amster Yard, the valuable unused development rights
are transferred to a contiguous adjacent lot. In the case of the
South Street Seaport, transfer may be made to designated noncontiguous lots within a radius of a few blocks.
In the case of the Tudor City private parks, their development
rights are transferred out of the immediate vicinity to the adjacent
midtown Manhattan business district.
1. Next Door: Amster Yard
Amster Yard is a 19th century collection of small residential
structures and stores in Midtown Manhattan."1 A logical outgrowth
of the courts' gradual acceptance of "aesthetic zoning" as an extension of the police power 2 has been the demand for the preservation of landmark buildings like Amster Yard and historic districts.
Early efforts in this area relied primarily on the use of private capital
for the acquisition of threatened buildings. It was not until 1956
that the New York State legislature passed enabling legislation for
the designation of landmarks and historical districts.6 3 Nine years
later, the City responded with its Landmarks Preservation Law64
and the creation of the Landmarks Preservation Commission.
Landmark officials were still faced with the problem of finding
a way to make zoning regulations work for, rather than against,
landmarks. In areas zoned for high density development, small landmark structures like Amster Yard are ripe for demolition and
61. Amster Yard is located on a through-block property east of Third Avenue
between 49th and 50th Streets.
62. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 NXE.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). (Ordinance prohibiting clotheslines from yards abutting
a street was upheld as a valid exercise of police power in order to preserve the residential appearance of the area.)
63. IAws oF NEw YoRK of 1956, ch. 216 § 1, now N.Y. GEN MuNic. LIAw § 96(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1972). See, J. J. Loflin, Zoning and Historic Districts in New York
City, 36 LAw-,& CoNraarm. PROB. 363, 364 (1971). The passage of this law (the Bard
Act) empowered the City to:
provide, for places, buildings, structures, works of art, and other objects having
a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value, special
conditions or regulations for their protection, enhancement, perpetuation or
use, which may include appropriate and reasonable control of the use or appearance of neighboring private property within public view, or both. In any such
instance such measures, if adopted in the exercise of the police power, shall be
reasonable and appropriate to the purpose, or if constituting a taking of private
property shall provide for due compensation....
64. NEw YoRK Crry ADmIsMmmAVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
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redevelopment." A technique was needed to fine tune the municipality's police power so that it would neither ride roughshod over
the property rights of the landmark owners nor force the City to
become ultimately bankrupt rather than face the destruction of its
cherished heritage.
The City's solution was to offer the landmark owner the option
to sell the development rights from a landmark and transfer them
to an eligible receiving lot in the form of a developmental flooi
area bonus for such lot.6 This innovation differed from the approach adopted in the special districts in two ways. First, the floor
area bonus mechanism was being used to save pre-existing bricks
and mortar threatened with demolition. Second, the development
rights were being transferred across zoning lot lines, rather than
being generated on the zoning lot by new development which itself
contained a desirable amenity or uneconomic use.
Traditionally, the New York City Zoning Resolution has permitted the transfer of development rights between two contiguous
zoning lots which are in the same ownership. Structures on such lots
can be held in fee ownership or through a long-term lease arrangement.6 7 In 1968, a zoning amendment was adopted which permitted
the landmark's development rights to be transferred to a noncontiguous lot.68
In effect, the development rights transfer was used to add rentable floor space to a new development contiguous to or across the
street from the low height and unique character of the landmark.
The rationale for this approach was founded in traditional land
regulation theory: the contiguous or across-the-street lot benefits
from the low landmark in terms of light and air and the City preserves part of its heritage.
Saving a landmark from the wrecker's ball does not ensure its
preservation. The 1968 amendment while requiring a program for
continuing maintenance does not, however, favor one particular
solution to the problem. In some cases, a historic structure can be
made self-supporting either by virtue of tourist fees or profitable
commercial or residential use.6 9 In 1970, the City recommended that
65. Many of the four- and five-story midtown landmarks are located in zones which
could accommodate residential or commercial structures many times their size.
66. N. Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, supra note 60, at 374.

67. 'Tor the purposes of this definition, ownership of a zoning lot shall be deemed
to include a lease of not less than 50 years duration, with an option to renew such
lease so as to provide a total lease of not less than 75 years duration." ZONING RESOLUTION § 12-10 (definition of "zoning lot").
68. ZONING RESOLUTION § 74-79 et seq.

69. Examples include Boston's Old City Hall, now thriving as a private office
building, and Ghiradelli Square in San Francisco, where a former candy factory is
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income from a $100,000 trust fund be applied to the maintenance
of the 19th century Amster Yard, a privately owned series of homes,
stores and interior garden.7 0 The owner of this landmark proposed
to sell a portion of his unused development rights to a contiguous
parcel on Third Avenue, where an office building was going to be
built. This private transaction was consummated and blessed by
the City which made sure that the facade of the new building would
71
be compatible with that of the smaller landmark structure.
2. Within the Immediate Vicinity: South Street Seaport
An even more ambitious development rights transfer scheme
involved the transfer of air rights within an urban renewal area.7 2
The purpose of the Special South Street Seaport District was to
make it possible to preserve and restore a number of approximately
200 year old historic buildings from the Fulton Fish Market in
Lower Manhattan while accommodating, at the same time, the construction plans of the developers.
The Special District contains a preservation area and a redevelopment area. 73 In accordance with the detailed urban renewal plan,
the low-scale of the Seaport will be retained by transferring development rights above the low buildings to specified neighboring locations for commercial development. All of the floor area potential not
exhausted by the old structures 74 may be shifted onto specified
parcels within the district.
In addition to conveyances to specified redevelopment lots, conveyance to middlemen was authorized, as well as subsequent conveyance in a chain that was required to end on one of the specified
redevelopment lots. The attempt was to make the development
rights as marketable as possible. An early sale would mean an early
start on the historic building renovation. In effect, a bank of development rights was authorized, under the immediate management
of private individuals, whose ultimate disposition was directed by
the City in the Special South Street Seaport District zoning legis75
lation.
now a stunning multi-level complex of boutiques and public open spaces. For other
examples, see generally PRooazssivE ARcH., Nov. 1972.
70. NEW YoRK Crr! PLANMNG ColAr,,ssION REP_.CP-21236 (July 20, 1970).
71. N. Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, supra note 60, at 376.
72. Special South Street Seaport District, ZONING REsOLurIONs § 89-00 et seq.
73. Id. § 89-02, 89-05. Preservation areas are designated as granting lots; redevelopment areas are designated as receiving lots.
74. These landmark buildings were rezoned for a bulk of FAR 10.

75. Cf. Costonis, The Chicago Plan:Incentive Zoning and the Preservationof Urban
Landmarks, 85 Hagv. L. Rv. 574 (1972).
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3. Outside the Immediate Vicinity: Tudor City Parks
Adjacent to Manhattan's densely populated Central Business
District a small patch of green can bring to passersby a welcome
sense of escape from monolithic skyscrapers and the cacophony of
the City streets. In many respects, the small park is more important
as an amenity than a landmark building or a shopping arcade. In
the past, a few public-spirited citizens have seen fit to donate such
urban oases to the City, 76 but such demonstrations of generosity are
rare. The recently enacted "Special Park District" amendment to
the Zoning Resolution 77 will ensure the preservation as public
parks of existing private parks without cost to the City through a
development rights transfer system.
The impetus for this proposal came from the plan announced
by a developer to build on two small private parks that he had
acquired as part of the Tudor City complex on Manhattan's east
side. Local residents, however, urged the City to save the forty-year
old parks which are valued at more than three million dollars. The
land costs precluded purchase of the parks by the City. Instead,
the Planning Commission took the unusual step of scheduling a
public hearing to outline five different development strategies.1 8
The final option, the creation of a special park district prohibiting
development on designated parks and mandating transfer of development rights therefrom, was the one ultimately approved. 0
76. Two examples are Paley Park at 53rd Street near Madison Avenue and Green-

acre Park at 51st Street between Second and Third Avenues.
77. ZONING RESOLUTION § 91-00 et seq. An interesting question is posed by the
existence of a security interest in the designated park. The instrument establishing
the terms and conditions of such security interest should be amended to encumber the
development rights with the same security interest as had attached to the designated
park.
78. a. The City could do nothing and allow two towers under existing traditional
zoning.
b. Zoning and mapping changes could be granted permitting development of
a 46-story tower on a platform spanning 42nd Street.
c. The tower could be built on the northern park, which would be replaced
by a new park on a bridge over 42nd Street.
d. Two towers would replace the existing private parks, but a new park would
be created on a deck over 42nd Street.
e. Creation of a special park district.
Innovative Proposals for Tudor City Parks, City Planning News, Sept. 19, 1972.
See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1972, at 38, col. 2 (editorial).
79. "It was a rare outburst at a City Planning Commission hearing-the audience
standing up and applauding the Commissioners after a vote. 'I wish I could kiss all
of you', said one elderly woman, while her neighbors in the Tudor City complex...
talked happily about their victory." Freiberg, 2 Parks Saved in Tudor City, N.Y.
Post, Nov. 9, 1972, at 11, col. 1.
The "Special Park District" which may be located anywhere from 8th to 60th
Streets, river to river, will require owners of designated existing private parks to sell or
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77

The "P" District provisions could add a number of privatelyowned parks, in addition to those at Tudor City, to a public classification. The legislation will also accord the same transfer rights to
privately-owned land in the Midtown core which has been mapped
as a public park, but has not as yet been acquired.80 The zoning
amendment stipulates that all such areas must meet uniform standards and be properly maintained. It will thereby enable the City
to add new parks within this high land value area without adding to
its capital or expense budgets.
The question that legal scholars must address themselves to is
how far may the police power be extended in a regulation of this
type without encroaching upon constitutionally protected property
rights. 81 The Special Park District proposal would seem a logical
extension of the municipality's general police power:
a. The provision of open space and parkland for City inhabitants falls within the scope of the "general welfare" requirement. 82
b. The forced dedication of land for park and recreational purposes has been upheld by the courts as within the police power.88
c. The case of the owner of a private park can be readily distinguished from that of the owner of a revenue-producing facility,84
where the courts will be more disposed to find that a purported regulation amounts to a "taking" for which just compensation must be
paid.
transfer their allowable development rights from the designated park to other parcels
within the district between Third and Eighth Avenues. Owners of parcels receiving
the development rights may have their FAR increased by as much as 20 percent, if
they have a ground area of at least 30,000 square feet and are in a commercial district
with a FAR of 15. Parcels within the Special Fifth Avenue and Theater Districts are
ineligible as receiving lots because of public policy against competing with objectives
of incentive zoning in those districts. ZONING RESOLUTION § 91-00 et seq.
80. An existing mapped park in private ownership on Tenth Avenue could qualify

under this provision.
81. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
82. E.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). It is hard to see any controlling difference between regulations which require the lot owner to leave open areas at the sides
and rear of his house and limit the extent of his use of the space above his lot and a
regulation which requires him to set his building a reasonable distance back from
the street. Each interferes in the same way, if not the same extent, with the omer's
right of dominion over his property. All rest for their justification upon the same
reasons which have arisen in recent times as a result of the great increase and concentration of population in urban communities and the vast changes in the extent

and complexity of the problems of modern city life. See also HAAR at 404-05.

83. Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949) (require-

ment of a ten-foot strip of land for tree and shrub planting purposes); In re Lake
Secor Development Co., 252 N.Y.S. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (neighborhood playgrounds or
other recreation uses required within the subdivision); Jenad Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
84. Vernon Park Realty Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d

517 (1954).
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d. The special needs of New York City add credence to the
"public purpose" rationale of the regulations. The Supreme Court
itself has indicated that the zoning power of municipalities increases
as their size and problems increase. In Euclid, the court said that "a
regulatory zoning" ordinance, which would be clearly valid as applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as applied to rural
communities.85
e. The Special District calls for the preservation of an existing
use, rather than a dedication of land for use in the future by an indeterminate group of people. Such innovative techniques of land regulation have found great receptivity in the courts, especially where
the regulations' rationality is supported by a firm comprehensive
planning basis.8 6
f. The Special "Y' District would serve to provide amenities to
the public without further threatening the liquidity of the City's
fiscal resources. "The economic and physical well-being of the municipality and its inhabitants, both governmental and personal, depends on the ability to furnish the necessary governmental services
' T
without at the same time bringing about a confiscatory tax levy."
g. The use of the City's eminent domain power is neither a
justifiable nor viable alternative in terms of fiscal policy. First, the
protection of economic position-the most salient effect of the constitutional prohibition against uncompensated takings-is not compromised by the Park District proposal. Given the provision allowing
the transfer of development rights, the proposal would not take from
the owner of a granting lot the economic benefit of his property; it
would merely direct him to exploit his property's development potential in a way that, while perhaps unorthodox, would nevertheless
be economically beneficial. Second, the City's shortage of funds
would preclude or seriously delay any attempt to acquire and maintain private parks.88
85. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 865, 887 (1926). In Southern
Pacific Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 46-47, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197, 202
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966), appeal dismissed, 385 US. 647 (1967) the court upheld a zoning
ordinance that prohibited the improvement of certain property abutting a highway
unless half the highway is dedicated and improved to the master plan width, saying
that a property owner assumes certain risks of police power regulation when living
in modern society under modem conditions, "particularly if he lives in the metropolitan area ...."
86. See generally NEw YoRK Crry PLANNING COMMISSION, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR

Tm Crry OF Naw YORK (1969), Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 50 N.Y.2d 859,
285 N.E.2d 291, 834 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
87. Newark Milk & Cream Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 47 N.J. Super. 806, 823,
135 A.2d 682, 691 (1957).
88. In Southern Pacific Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 88, 48, 51 Cal.
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C. Privately Reimbursed Exercise of Eminent Domain
As incentive zoning seizes upon the typical developer's hunger
for more rentable floor area, so would exercise of the condemnation
power to eliminate holdouts 89 permit a developer to exploit the full
potential of his land assemblage. Use of this eminent domain technique can achieve trade-offs in the public interest, provided that
reimbursement of the City's condemnation cost together with the
cost of City-exacted amenities in the future development do not outweigh the developer's advantage in eliminating the holdout.
Incentive zoning is far from the only means that the government
has to shape public development. Special assessment 0 and administrative codes 91 have already been suggested as alternatives. Professor
Allen Fonoroff has proposed that the eminent domain power be
exercised more often since "it relieves many courts of the unenviable
choice of either upholding a regulation which in fact is a taking of
considerable rights or rejecting a regulation thereby leaving the
92
future use of the land to the developer."
The traditional use of eminent domain, however, has its practical
and conceptual limitations. It has been generally opposed by community groups who feel that the loss of their homes to "The Federal
Bulldozer" 93 is not for their general welfare. In recent years, City
administrators have been loathe to exercise this power both in deference to the demands of the community groups and in recognition
of the scarcity of fiscal resources. Conceptually, a taking must be
for a public purpose, but this need not involve a public reuse. 94
The City, acting as a conduit, could acquire certain land in fee
simple for the public purpose of redevelopment in the public
interest and instead of keeping it in public ownership, reconvey or
lease it to a developer, "subject to specified covenants, restrictions,
conditions, or affirmative requirements designed to protect the
Rptr. 197, 203 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) the court noted testimony that because of the

lack of public funds it would take more than one hundred years to achieve the goal
of widening existing streets if only eminent domain were available as a tool.
89. Holdouts tend to cut good sites into relatively useless islands, thereby discouraging the orderly development of business centers. But the City cannot indiscriminately condemn every little parcel that blocks large-scale commercial development.
The right to condemn involves a careful balancing of an individual's property rights
against the broader "general welfare."
90. Fonoroff in NEw ZONING at 92.
91. See note 63 supra.
92. Fonoroff in NEw ZONING at 91.
93. See NJ. ANDERsON, THE FEDERAL BuLLuozER 191-2 (1964).

94. Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance
Requiem, 58 YALE LJ. 599, 610 (1949).
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public interest and to accomplish the [public] purposes of the
special district."95
New York City has supported this concept and has backed the
introduction of legislation in the New York State Legislature that
would create a central business development district in Manhattan. 0
Such enabling authority would permit the City, after two public
hearings, to exercise its power of condemnation and acquire interests
in non-residentialholdout property within the district unreasonably
blocking a development. The public review of a redevelopment plan
would not begin until the developer had obtained fee title interest
in at least 85 percent of a development site covering at least one
city block or 40,000 square feet, whichever is less. After condemnation, the holdout parcel would be sold to the developer who
would be required to build on his site in conformance with a
7
publicly-approved plan as well as to assist in relocating the holdout.
The public purpose of such a privately reimbursed exercise of
eminent domain primarily rests upon its importance to the City's
economic base. In the holdout situation, there is an identity between
public and private purpose which arises out of a common recognition
that the holdout robs valuable land of its great potential.
The historical concern of municipalities and states in protecting
the economic base on which communities are founded has manifested itself in many other ways which reflect other regional problems. The Supreme Court of the United States has sustained
numerous statutes with economic protection as their admitted
purpose. In Clark v. Nash9s and Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining
Co.,99 the Supreme Court approved Utah statutes which permitted
condemnation of private rights-of-way for irrigation and mining
purposes against charges that the statutes authorized taking for
private rather than public purposes. 100 In doing so, the Court
deferred heavily to regional differences and to the significance of
irrigation and mining to the economic vitality of the State.
In Clark v. Nash, the Court sustained a statute that permitted
condemnation for privately used irrigation drains because it was
"made for the very purposes of thereby contributing to the growth
95. Fonoroff in NEw ZONING at 91. This can ensure that the design quality of new

office construction remains first-rate and contains such public improvements as transit
connections, pedestrian amenities, libraries and parks.
96. S 5605c, A 6905c. New York State Legislature (1972) (not acted upon).

97. Id. This district would generally run south of 59th Street in Manhattan.
98. 198 U.S. 361 (1904).
99. 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
100. See also Marrs v. City of Oxford, 32 F.2d 134 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S.
573 (1929); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
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and prosperity of those States arising from mining and the cultivation of an otherwise valueless soil by means of irrigation."0 1 The
Court expressed apprehension as to the State's future growth and
prosperity should the statute be declared invalid.
In Strickley, a private owner was permitted to condemn a rightof-way for an aerial bucket to carry his mining materials across other
private land. The Court said: 02
While emphasizing the great caution necessary to be shown
[in the use of eminent domain], it has proved that there
might be exceptional times and places in which the very
foundations of a public welfare could not be laid without
requiring concessions from individuals to each other upon
due compensation, which, under other circumstances, would
be left wholly to voluntary consent. In such unusual cases
there is nothing in the 14th Amendment which prevents a
State from requiring such concessions.... In the opinion of
the legislature and the Supreme Court of Utah the public
welfare of that State demands that aerial lines between the
mines upon its mountain sites and railways in the valleys
below should not be made impossible by the refusal of a
private owner to sell the right to cross his land. The Constitution of the United States does not require us to say that
they are wrong.
The New York Court of Appeals sustained the World Trade
Center legislation in Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc., v. Port of New
York Authority.0 3 Among the issues on appeal was the question of
whether centralization of world trade was a "public purpose."'104
The court concurred with the Appellate Division on that issue and
noted as follows: 105
The Appellate Division has stated that the concept of the
World Trade Center is a public purpose. We understand
this to mean that any use of the property sought to be condemned that is functionally related to the centralizing of all
port business is unobjectionable even though private persons
are to be the immediate lessees. The "concept" referred to
by the Appellate Division can mean only that. It is the
101. 198 U.S. 361, 370 (1904).

102. 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906).
103. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).

104. Id. at 896, 190 N.E.2d at 409, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 12 (dissenting opinion).
105. Id. at 388, 190 N.E.2d at 404, 240 N.YS.2d at 5.
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gathering together of all business relating to world trade that
is supposed to be the great convenience held out to those who
use American ports and which is supposed to attract trade
with a resultant stimulus to the economic well-being of the
Port of New York. This benefit is not too remote or speculative as to render the means chosen to achieve it patently unreasonable; nor is the benefit sought itself an improper concern of government.
In addition to the eminent domain approach to the holdout
problem, alternative new zoning tools could permit public benefit
to be reaped from holdout situations. Instead of letting these vestiges
become parking lots, as is usually the case, we could encourage their
development as small parks. It would be possible in many instances
to permit the transfer of development rights0 6 from such parcels to
the project of which they had, initially, been intended to become
part. The isolated lot, its development potential utilized, could
become a park.
The isolated property would then have a value similar to the
properties comprising the major assemblage and no penalty would
be imposed on the owner by requiring him to develop and maintain
the isolated lot as a landscaped park. Appropriate standards, including minimum lot size and location requirements for such parks,
could be developed. The effect of such a zoning technique would
be to reduce the leverage exerted by the hold-outs, since the
economic utilization of the isolated parcel would no longer be a
problem.
The holdout problem is thorny, but its resolution is important
to the continued vitality of the commercial core-which is integral
to the well-being of the City and the region. We believe the solution
suggested in the proposed eminent domain legislation and its zoning
alternative meet the tests of public purpose, fairness and equity.
D.

Restrictions Running with the Land

Traditional land use regulation classifies areas of the City into
zoning districts. Roughly similar areas receive common classification.
Districts contain use, density, bulk and parking controls which
form a common denominator of its areas' characteristics. This system
rarely recognizes uniqueness in neighborhoods as a basis for higher
or special standards and often by their omission promotes develop106. The zoning approach would be similar to that employed in the Special Park
District, note 79 supra, except that it would be optional rather than mandatory.
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ment which is incompatible with the character of such neighborhoods. Conditional zoning, involving imposition of restrictions
running with the rezoned land, is one method of remedying this
problem.
Conditional zoning involves the reclassification of an applicant's
property to another zoning category coupled with the imposition
of conditions designed to ameliorate the impact of the new development on neighboring properties. Early cases viewed this approach
as tantamount to "spot zoning"10 7 or "special privilege legislation."108 Later cases, however, almost uniformly approve the
device.'0 9 In Church v. Town of Islip,o the New York Court of
Appeals would not accept appellant's arguments that the ordinance
was illegal as "contract zoning""'. because the Town Board, as a
condition for rezoning, required the owners to execute and record
restrictive covenants as to maximum area to be occupied by buildings and as to a fence and shrubbery. Echoing decisions which justified similar restriction as part of the municipality's police power,
the court concluded that the zoning "conditions were intended to be
2
and are for the benefit of the neighbors.""
Under the authority of Church v. Town of Islip, New York City
has used restrictive declarations or covenants running with the land
as a prime means of controlling development. Although this tool
often accompanies special permits and other expressly conditional
forms of zoning approval, its principal exercise has occurred in the
traditionally unconditioned areas of zoning.
Zoning classifications are not forged for eternity and the dynamic
of change continually brings about requests for alteration of a zoning classification.
107. Spot zoning is a pejorative expression usually denoting an intention to benefit
a single property owner rather than zone in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
The "spot zone", instead of constituting a part of a larger area which is zoned uniformly, sticks out like a sore thumb from its more restrictively zoned neighbors. For
an extensive discussion of spot zoning, see R. M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING

§§ 5.04 to 5.13 (1968).
108. Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
109. Pecora v. Zoning Commission, 145 Conn. 435, 144 A.2d 48 (1958); Hudson Oil
Co. of Missouri v. City of Wichita, 193 Kan. 623, 396 P.2d 271 (1964); Sylvania Electric
Products, Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962).
110. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683, 203 N.Y.S2d 866, 869 (1960).
111. Contract zoning is a pejorative expression used by courts in striking down a
zoning amendment which is coupled with an agreement by a property owner to
develop in a certain way. The prohibited contract involves a constraint on the municipality's theoretically untrammelable exercise of its police power. Courts which approve
of this technique label it "conditional zoning" and find no "contract" or obligation on
the part of the municipality to refrain from exercising its police power functions.
112. 8 N.Y.2d at 259, 168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
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A changed classification by no means assures the object sought by
the City in agreeing to the requested change. Each classification
usually permits a variety of uses and arrangements of bulk and
parking on a lot. Some of those uses and some of those building
arrangements may be perfectly acceptable to neighboring property
owners while other permutations permissible within the classification may be utterly unacceptable either to neighbors or to the
larger community including the City. For the zoning reclassification
to command support, a way must be found to permit its desirable
consequences and prevent the undesirable ones.118
In those cases where the potential harm of standard classification
poses a serious threat, the City's practice is to require the property
owner to record a restrictive declaration incorporating special conditions and restrictions controlling development so that any new
development will blend into its surrounding neighborhood." 4
The value of this procedure is twofold. Development which
benefits the City is not stifled because of valid fears concerning the
other alternatives unlocked by a zoning reclassification. Accidental
and unintended erosion of neighborhoods by unconditional zoning
reclassification is avoided.
Ancillary benefits often emerge under an incentive zoning
rationale. The reclassification sought may materially increase the
value of the property affected. It may be appropriate, either on an
externalities" 5 justification or simply as a neighborly gesture for
the zoning applicant to covenant a major public amenity such as a
park, or grant a subway access easement as an additional condition
justifying the rezoning in the eyes of the City.
Perhaps the most dramatic use of this technique came in 1971,
when the City conditioned its approval of a large-scale residential
development on the privately-owned Glen Oaks Golf Course in
Queens 1 upon a restrictive declaration filed in the Queens Property
113. A typical case might involve a religious institution, its residentially-zoned
property having appreciated in value as a regional commercial center edged ever closer.
The institution decides to sell out and move to a quieter area. The contract vendee
requests a zoning reclassification from residential to regional commercial so that it
may put up a department store. If the reclassification were granted without conditions,
the property could be subdivided to permit a variety of other commercial uses resulting
in parking lots with entrances and exits cutting across residential and school pedestrian

routes and night lighting shining directly into apartments.
114. The declaration additionally recites the beneficiaries of its provisions among
which is the City, the fact that it is a covenant running with the land, and it sets
forth a procedure for modification which requires City approval. See Nmv YoRK CIT
PLANNING COMISSION REP. CP-21651 (Aug. 11, 1971).

115. See note 50 supra.
116. The golf course was zoned R3-2, a relatively low-density residential classification
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Register's Office. Under the terms of the declaration, which runs
with the land and binds the owner and his successors and assigns,
almost 100 acres of unique and irreplaceable open space topography
would be left forever in its natural state, regardless of future zoning
7
reclassification of the property."
E. Incentive Planned Unit Development Zones
In the early Sixties, as virgin land areas diminished, planned
unit development and cluster zoning proposals were adopted by
which permits apartment houses as well as one- and two-family houses. New York City
Zoning Map lid, effective Mar. 25, 1971, City Planning Commission.
117. The Commission's discussion of the choices with which it was faced in this
instance is instructive:
Much of the testimony at the public hearing was addressed to the height of
the three apartment houses. Speakers argued that 82-story structures would
destroy the suburban character of the neighborhood, were visually offensive and
environmentally destructive. Some speakers simply urged the Commission to
reject the request for a special permit. Other speakers suggested as an alternative
that the City acquire the 106 acre tract and map it as a public park.
The Commission is sympathetic to the community's desire for a new public
park. However, this would be a costly solution. The property is reported to have
cost the developer $12 million. In the light of the City's limited financial
resources, an outlay of this magnitude for this purpose cannot be justified.
The proposed development leaves untouched almost all of the existing open
space. The ground floor area of the buildings will cover only some two percent
of the site. Moreover, the open space is further protected by a covenant contained
in a declaration attached herewith which prevents the owner of the property
from ever building outside a certain circumscribed area regardless of what the
zoning may call for in the distant future. The permanent dedication of open
space under this covenant will be nearly 100 acres ...
If the special permit were denied, the developer would still have the as-ofright option to build more than 2,500 one-family homes. This would satisfy the
community's desire to retain a low level profile, of course. But it would totally
destroy the golf course and open space. At least 20 percent of the area would
have to be devoted to paved streets which, in turn, would substantially increase
the requirement for storm sewers since the run-off would be greater. In fact,
material requirements for all utilities would be much heavier for the one-family
homes than for the apartment towers. The one-family development would also
generate more traffic.
Ecologists who appeal to the Commission to reject the special permit overlook
the fact that one-family developments place a far greater strain on the environment than do apartment buildings in park-like settings, a common practice in
British and Scandinavian suburbs.
In making its decision, the Commission is not deciding whether there should
or should not be high rise development on the Glen Oaks golf course. The Commission's choices are limited: to grant the special permit and guarantee the
protection of most of the open space or to reject the special permit and thus
allow the developer to either cover the open space with one-family homes or to
build high rise apartments but no stores or underground parking. It is the
Commission's judgment that it is in the best interest of the community to protect
the open space and to insure its future protection as well by granting the special
permit.
Nav Yox Crr, PLANmN

ComnssoN REP. CP-21651 (Aug. 11, 1971).
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communities interested in setting aside land for schools, recreation
areas and green spaces.""' Most courts held that "such an ordinance
reasonably advances the legislative purposes of securing open spaces,
preventing over-crowding and undue concentration of population,
and promoting the general welfare." 1 9 Such ordinances waived
normal setback from streets and yard requirements in order to create
larger and more usable common open spaces. 20
Because of New York City's concern over the quality of development in the remaining vacant land areas121 as well as with the retention of as much natural landscape as possible, planned unit
development provisions were incorporated in the zoning resolution.122 This particular type of floating zone' 23 may be overlaid on
low-density residentially-zoned areas upon application of a developer
who owns a parcel of sufficient size. 124
The floor area bonus technique of incentive zoning is used to
foster better design and to protect open space and natural topography. A 15 percent density increment is the maximum bonus
obtainable.125
The problems of large-scale protection of natural resources are
not going to be solved by development regulations alone. In rare
cases, such as Glen Oaks, as much as 100 acres of natural topography
118. ZONING R-SOLuriON § 78-00, et seq. [Planned Unit Development].

119. Chrinko v. South Brunswick Township Planning Board, 77 N.J. Super. 594,
601, 187 A.2d 221, 225 (1963).

120. Consider a standard subdivision layout with look-alike houses separated by
useless side yards on a gridiron street pattern. Major dredging of a swampy area may
be required before such residential construction can proceed. A planned unit development, on the other hand, could achieve considerable economies by inexpensively
converting the swamp into a common open space and clustering the bonussed number
of units on the somewhat smaller balance of the site. The converted swamp, with
resident ducks, rowboats or swimmers, reasserts, albeit in modified form, a semblance
of the natural landscape and ecological balance pre-existing in the area.
121. Most of the vacant land in New York City lies in South Richmond.
122. See note 118 supra.
123. A floating zone describes a district set up in the zoning ordinance but not,
at least at the outset, mapped in a particular location.
The regulations for the district spell out ...
the variety of circumstances that
must exist to enable a land owner successfully to apply for a reclassification to
the floating zone. The criteria also typically set forth a variety of performance
standards that enable quite individualized treatment of details.
Heyman in NEw ZONING at 89. See Rogers v. Village of Tarrytown 802 N.Y. 115, 96
N.E.2d 731 (1951).
124. In New York City the threshold is one and one-half acres. ZONING RESOLUTION
§ 78-02.
125. This bonus is for good site design and provision of common open space. The
latter arrangement patterned after the successful 19th Century Gramercy Park close,
requires a recorded instrument setting forth the rights to this space and the obligations
incurred by those enjoying such rights. See URBAN LAND INSrITTE, TECHNICAL BULLETIN
50 (1964) for typical agreements.
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were preserved. Many planned unit developments are smaller and
conserve proportionately less open space. The primary purpose of
their regulations is improvement in the quality of residential environment, not prevention of development in order to preserve the
environment of a much larger region. 126
F. Development Easements
All of the techniques discussed above have employed some
combination of carrot and stick to achieve a greater degree of public
control over private investment. Perhaps the smallest carrot coupled
with the biggest stick is contained in the development easement
system devised by a small community in New York State. And the
prize sought is nothing less than orderly growth, timed in accordance
127
with a public plan for provision of municipal services and facilities.
Ramapo, New York128 is a suburban town thirty miles away from
New York City. Large and small municipalities share the common
problems of runaway residential growth and rapid tax hikes129 that
far outpace the community's ability to provide relief in the form
of supportive services and capital facilities. The Ramapo town supervisor has devised a regulatory scheme that coordinates development
with an 18-year capital improvement plan for sewers, drainage
facilities, improved public parks or recreation facilities, public
126. Regulations which "freeze" land in its natural state, rendering it valueless,
have been struck down. In Morris County Land Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 555-56, 193 A.2d 232, 241-42 (1963), the court invalidated a regulation

which limited use of the Jersey Great Swamp to conservation-oriented uses, observing
that:
These are laudable purposes and we do not doubt the highmindedness of their

motivation ... [but the] public uses are necessarily so all-encompassing as practically to prevent the exercise by a private owner of any worthwhile rights or
benefits in the land. So public acquisition rather than regulation is required.
See Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission of the Town of Fairfield, 151 Conn.
304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964) (ordinance limiting uses of flood plain district was invalidated). But see Commissioner of Natural Resources v. Volpe and Co., 349 Mass.

104, 111, 206 N.E2d 666, 671 (1965) where the court did not strike down a statute
prohibiting dredging or filling of marshlands without the consent of proper authorities.
Instead, the case was remanded to the lower court for a determination as to the degree
of private deprivation:
In this conflict between the ecological and the constitutional, it is plain that
neither is to be consumed by the other. It is the duty of the department of
conservation to look after the interests of the former, and it is the duty of the
courts to stand guard over the constitutional rights.
127. Oser, Innovator in Suburbs Under Fire, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1971, § 8, at 1.
128. Ramapo's total population is 76,700, but the Town Supervisor's "planning and
zoning jurisdiction encompasses only the unincorporated area where 45,400 citizens live,
and not the incorporated villages of Sloatsburg, Hillburn, Suffern, Spring Valley, New
Square and Pomona." Id. at 6.
129. "In the same period that the population was doubling, the school tax was
increasing threefold." Id.
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schools, roads and firehouses. In accordance with a "development
easement system" owners of property would be unable to build on
their land until it amassed fifteen "points,"'1 0 which are assigned as
capital improvements are supplied. Developers have the option of
either providing the facilities themselves or foregoing their construction rights for specific time periods during which they may receive
tax abatements on their property from a Development Easement
Acquisition Commission. These controls do not amount to an
absolute moratorium on all growth, since the zoning amendments
contemplate a definite term of years during which the town is committed to the construction and installation of capital improvements.13 1
The development easement system proved to be innovative and
controversial. Fourteen law suits have been brought against the
Ramapo Town Supervisor. On May 3, 1972 the New York Court of
Appeals reversed two lower court decisions and held the Ramapo
regulatory plan to be constitutional. A closer look at Golden v.
Planning Board of Ramapo8" is warranted, since the decision has
important legal and planning ramifications that could directly influence development patterns in other areas of the State, and by
imitation, throughout the country. Despite the case's modernity,
it also reflects a struggle that has been waging within communities
since before the time of Euclid between the rights of the property
owner to resist confiscation and the rights of the municipality to
protect the community from the harmful effects of urban redevelopment. It also reflects the current concern over total environment
which is adversely affected by runaway development discharging
untreated sewage into public waters, accelerating erosion and runoff
through rapid increase in paved surfaces, etc.
Judge Scileppi, in his majority opinion, recognized these conflicting forces and noted that the potential harm alleged by the
complaining landholders was "immediate and... sufficient to raise
a justiciable issue as to the validity of the subject ordinance."'18
In effect, the central inquiry that the court makes is not into
130. In residential zones, "points" are awarded as follows: five points for a public
sewer, three points for a package sewerage plant, from five points for optimal drainage

capacity to one point for 50 percent capacity, five points if a school is within a quarter
of a mile, one point if it is within a mile. TowN OF RAMAPO BUiLDING ZONE ORDINANCE,

§ 46-13.1D. See Planning, THE ASPO MAGAZINE 108, July 1972.
131. See Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255, 167 N.Y.S.2d
843 (1957).
132. 50 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.YS.2d 138 (1972).
133. Id. at 366, 285 NE.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
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the laudatory goals of the Ramapo plan but into the mechanism
that the Town has seen fit to adopt in order to attain these goals.
Judge Scileppi held that the Town's use of its police power was not
ultra vires and void. The "power to zone" was necessarily complemented by the requirement that "the development of unimproved areas be accompanied by provision of essential facilities."' 34
Taken together, they "seek to implement a broader, comprehensive
plan for community development."' 8 5
The court did not find the zoning amendments to be arbitrary.
It carefully examined the potentially confiscatory nature of the
regulations. The situation in Ramapo differs from the typical subdivision case where the developer's obligation to provide an amenity
is secured by a performance bond. In this case, plat approval is
conditioned upon the Town's obligation to undertake the improvements.8 6 "Whether it is the municipality or the developer who is to
provide the improvements, the objective is the same-to provide
adequate facilities, off-site and on-site; and in either case subdivision
137
rights are conditioned, not denied."'
The Ramapo ordinance therefore calls for a temporary and not
a permanent restriction. The burden that is imposed on the property owner is relieved somewhat by the tax abatement provision and
by the ultimate benefit inuring to him in the form of a substantial
increase in future valuation 83 Any diminution in value is a
"relative" factor and though its magnitude is an indication of a
taking, it does not of itself establish confiscation.
The major issue raised by Judge Breitel in his dissenting opinion
dealt with what he viewed to be an "exclusion in effect or by motive,
of walled-in urban populations of the middle class and the poor."'189
Although his criticism was rebutted by the Town Attorney in
Ramapo, 40 it is an important reminder that the "police power"
to zone and regulate is still subject to constitutional limitations.
Judge Scileppi, however, views Ramapo's system as a "first step...
134. Id. at
135. Id.

372, 285 N.E.2d at 298, 334 N.YS.2d at 147.

136. Id. at 373 n.7, 285 N.E.2d at 298 n.7, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 148 n.7.
137. Id. at 374, 285 N.E.2d at 299, 334 N.YS.2d at 148.
138. Id. at 880, 285 N.E2d at 305, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
139. Id. at 883, 285 NXE.2d at 805, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
140. In Golden v. Town of Ramapo, Establishing a New Direction in American
PlanningLaw, 4 TBE URBAN IAwYEa ix, xiii (Summer 1972) the attorney for the town
of Ramapo wrote that "Ramapo was the first suburban town in New York State to
voluntarily, as part of its planning process, develop integrated public housing for low
income families over the objection of thousands of its citizens."
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toward controlled growth achieved without foresaking broader
social purposes."'141 He added that: 142
Ramapo asks not that it be left alone, but only that it be
allowed to prevent the kind of deterioration that has transformed well-ordered and thriving residential communities
into blighted ghettos with attendant hazards to health, security
and social stability ....
At best, the exclusionary issue raised in the Ramapo dissent
would be a criticism of the Ramapo development easement system
as applied, not an attack on the validity of the device itself. The
device clearly merits consideration as a planning tool of considerable
strength and effectiveness.
The Ramapo plan is significant in that it offers a community a
way to marry the demands for growth to a growing concern for the
environment. By relating the pace of development to a plan for
capital improvement, the municipality can plan for the ever-broadening general welfare without imposing an impermissible restriction
on the private landowner. New York City's use of the Planned Use
Development in Staten Island 48 or the restrictive declaration in
Glen Oaks 44 are pieces of a puzzle that the Village of Ramapo is on
its way to solving. Ramapo's solution suggests a way for New York
City to proceed with the development of predominantly vacant,
unstreeted and unsewered South Richmond and other large-scale
development sites' 45 in the City.
The South Richmond Development Corporation legislation
which relies heavily upon eminent domain powers, currently pending before the State Legislature is an alternative step towards the
goal of tying residential development to the availability of fiscal
resources for the construction of a network of infrastructure and
supportive facilities. 1 46 Prompting this legislation was the fear that
premature subdivision and development without the proper environmental infrastructure would repeat the mistakes of the past.
The Ramapo method achieves this objective over an 18-year
period based on an assessment of its own resources and the resources
of likely developers. The South Richmond legislation looks to bond
80 N.Y.2d at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
Id. at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
See discussion in Section 11 E of this article supra.
See discussion in Section 11 D of this article supra.
Compare AN ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT TRENDS AND PRojECrTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEw CITY IN SoUTrH RICHMOND (The Rouse Company, May 1970).
146. S 8892, New York State Legislature (1972) (not acted upon).
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 6

From Euclid to Ramapo
financing secured by the value of vacant city-owned land in the area
and the resources of likely developers as well. Both Ramapo and the
147
South Richmond legislation are motivated by common concerns:
1. The need to economize on the costs of municipal facilities
and services.
2. The need to retain municipal control over the eventual
character of development.
8. The need to maintain a desirable degree of balance among
various uses of land.
4. The need to achieve greater detail and specificity in development regulation.
5. The need to maintain a high quality of community services
and facilities.
III.

CONCLUSION

The actual impact on development of the techniques discussed
above has been dramatic. Eighteen million dollars of new theaters
have been constructed; new circulation improvements have been
built; the first mixed use (retail stores, offices and apartments) building ever built on Fifth Avenue is under construction; development
rights potentially worth $10 million will make possible the preservation in high land value areas of historic buildings and vest pocket
parks; a $12,000,000 open space resource in Eastern Queens has been
permanently preserved; an entire community has insured its orderly
growth over an 18-year period. In every instance intervention by
the government has been far greater than that previously tolerated
and planning goals have been more explicitly achieved. Such techniques do not violate any private rights while permitting far more
effective City growth. The goal remains constant: public control
of private investment without violation of constitutional safeguards
or the municipal treasures.
147. BERcmt at 737-38; Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20
LAWv & CONTEM. PROB. 298, 300-01 (1955).
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